Recently, a relevant ruling by the Constitutional Chamber was released to the public, which declared unconstitutional the phrase in Article 49 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) that mandated composing a person's name using their "given name" (nombre de pila), the father's surname, and the mother's surname, in that exact order and without exception. It is still necessary to review the ruling in its entirety to understand the arguments, motives, and, above all, its scope in detail. Generally speaking, a statute—or a portion of it—that is declared unconstitutional immediately ceases to have legal effect. Exceptionally, the Constitutional Chamber has deferred the effects of unconstitutionality to a later date, but there is no indication that this is the case here.

The phrase in Article 49 of the Civil Code, now declared unconstitutional, certainly reflected not only a different era but also a different scale of social values and a different way of understanding and confronting the world. It is an odious patriarchal remnant that has long lacked any raison d'être. There is no legal, social, or moral justification for maintaining it. Costa Rica is a signatory to multiple international treaties that protect and safeguard women's rights to equality and a life free from all types of violence, including: the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women; the Quito Consensus; the Brasilia Consensus; and the Inter-American Convention against All Forms of Discrimination and Intolerance.

The aforementioned phrase in Article 49 of the Civil Code was a statutory legal rule contrary to all commitments assumed by Costa Rica under the indicated international conventions. Compulsorily establishing that, regardless of any circumstances, the male surname must always precede the female surname is a form of violence, clear discrimination, and an evident violation of women's right to equal treatment. A rule such as the one recently struck down from the legal system implied that women were always displaced by men in the formation of the name and identity of a child procreated together, with no possibility to choose and weigh the concrete conditions of particular situations.

The issue is not minor: in Costa Rica, 4 out of every 10 households are single-parent structures led by women. [1] Human experience shows us that in a large portion of these households, sons and daughters have little to no emotional relationship with their father, and in many cases, there is no bond other than bearing his surname. Against this backdrop, it is highly significant that the possibility and right now exist for these sons and daughters to bear their mother's surname first—the person with whom they presumably have a closer emotional, personal, and economic bond and, consequently, the most meaningful individual in building their identity as persons. The right to choose is vital, and that is precisely the core of the ruling discussed: being able to decide in freedom and equality.

Other scenarios are equally legitimate: individuals who are now of legal age and who, for various reasons, have no bond with their father and feel indifferent about carrying his surname as a priority; adults who have a bond with their father but, for various reasons, prefer to carry their mother's surname first; mothers and fathers who agree to arrange it that way, etc. At this point, it is important to note that the specific scope of application (dimensionamiento) that the Constitutional Chamber granted to this change regarding adults is still unknown. For instance, doubts arise as to what will happen to the children of adults who choose to modify the order of their surnames. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones), as the governing body of the Civil Registry (Registro Civil), must follow suit and establish the timelines, parameters, and conditions of application.

Another matter that must be regulated is the scenario where a mother and father fail to reach an agreement to establish the order. Let us think, for example, of a person who is currently a minor. It could happen that one parent wishes to take advantage of this new possibility and change the surnames, but the other disagrees. It will likely fall upon Family Judges to make these determinations based on parameters that, naturally, will have to be shaped and refined over time and through case-by-case adjudication. The same fate will apply to a person at birth: who will determine, at least preliminarily, the order in the event of a disagreement between the mother and the father? What criteria will be used? Only the practical implementation of the statutory modification will provide us with the answers, and it is expected that there will be periods of uncertainty and transitional practices before achieving a balanced response to all the situations that may arise.

It is worth clarifying that none of the obligations and rights derived from both paternity and maternity undergo any alteration or impact as a consequence of this regulatory change.